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Ruff v0.16.0

Ruff v0.16.0

Ruff v0.16.0 Astral shipped a significant new version of their Ruff Python linting tool a few days ago on July 23rd. I noticed today because my various CI jobs all started failing thanks to new default Ruff checks and my unpinned "ruff" dev dependency. From Brent Westbrook's announcement post: Ruff now enables 413 rules by default, up from 59 in previous versions. Since Ruff's default rule set was last modified in v0.1.0, the number of rules in Ruff has grown from 708 to 968. Many of these…

Simon Willison's Weblog
Quoting Boris Cherny

Quoting Boris Cherny

More than any of these eval scores, what is most exciting to me is something else: Opus 5 is our least prompt injectable model yet. It is a bit buried in the system card, but across PI evals and red teaming, Opus 5 is very hard to prompt inject successfully. — Boris Cherny, here's that System Card section, page 73 Tags: prompt-injection, anthropic, claude, generative-ai, ai, llms, boris-cherny

Simon Willison's Weblog
Introducing Claude Opus 5

Introducing Claude Opus 5

Introducing Claude Opus 5 I've been offline kayaking with sea otters for much of today so I haven't had a chance to put Anthropic's new model Claude Opus 5 through its paces yet. The buzz is positive, and Anthropic's description of it as a "thoughtful and proactive model that comes close to the frontier intelligence of Claude Fable 5 at half the price" sounds promising. It's currently leading the Artificial Analysis leaderboard, in front of even Fable 5. It's priced the same as Opus 4.8, and…

Simon Willison's Weblog
The first known runaway AI agent - or a very bad marketing stunt?

The first known runaway AI agent - or a very bad marketing stunt?

The first known runaway AI agent - or a very bad marketing stunt? Martin Alderson's commentary on the OpenAI accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face includes a couple of details I hadn't considered. First, Hugging Face offers a truly rich target if you're trying to find potential vulnerabilities that require executing arbitrary code: Hugging Face has an enormous attack surface. They have more interfaces than I can count which run untrusted models and code. While they definitely have…

Simon Willison's Weblog
Quoting Seth Larson

Quoting Seth Larson

The Python Package Index (PyPI) now rejects new files being uploaded to releases that are older than 14 days. This restriction was put in place to prevent old and long-stable releases from being poisoned in case publishing tokens or workflows of PyPI projects were compromised. As far as we are aware this has not yet been abused, but there is no technical reason beyond that attackers weren't aware it was possible. — Seth Larson, PyPI blog Tags: packaging, python, supply-chain, pypi,…

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Quoting Thomas Ptacek

Quoting Thomas Ptacek

I genuinely believe that if you took an open weights model from 2025 and built a pentest harness for it, it could do this kind of sandbox escape and scan/hack in most networks. This is only surprising because you assume OpenAI has sounder sandboxes. — Thomas Ptacek, doesn't think this even needs a frontier model Tags: thomas-ptacek, openai, security, generative-ai, ai-security-research, ai, llms, sandboxing

Simon Willison's Weblog
OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened

OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened

This story is wild. The short version: OpenAI were running a cybersecurity test against an unreleased model, with the model's guardrail features turned off. Rather than solve the test, the model broke its way out of OpenAI's sandbox, then found exploits to break in to Hugging Face, all so it could cheat on the test by stealing the answers. Along the way it helped make the strongest case yet for how the imbalance of model availability is hurting our ability to secure our software. Here's what…

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Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing?

Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing?

Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing? Excellent piece of work by Dylan Castillo, who took a deep-dive into the frequently pondered question of whether the AI labs have been deliberately training models to draw pelicans riding bicycles in response to my deeply unscientific benchmark. I've been randomly spot-checking this in the past by testing models against other animals riding other types of vehicle, but never with anything close to the diligence of Dylan's methodology here. Dylan took 8 animals × 6…

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Orchestrions

Orchestrions

San Francisco tip: it only costs around $15 ($10 in quarters plus a $5 bill for the self-playing violin) to activate every single Orchestrion in Musée Mécanique. And because most people are bad at allocating their funds you may well be the ONLY person activating the Orchestrions, which means you get to craft the soundscape for the entire museum. Tags: san-francisco

Simon Willison's Weblog
Nativ: Run AI models locally on your Mac

Nativ: Run AI models locally on your Mac

Nativ: Run AI models locally on your Mac Prince Canuma is the developer behind the excellent MLX-VLM Python library for running vision-LLMs using MLX on a Mac. I'm really excited about his new project, which wraps MLX in a full macOS desktop application. It's similar in shape to LM Studio, providing both a chat interface and a localhost API server for accessing models. The app picked up MLX models I had already tried that were present in my Hugging Face cache directory, which was a nice touch.…

Simon Willison's Weblog
A Fireside Chat with Cat and Thariq from the Claude Code team

A Fireside Chat with Cat and Thariq from the Claude Code team

Earlier this month I hosted a fireside chat session at the AI Engineer World's Fair with Cat Wu and Thariq Shihipar from Anthropic's Claude Code team. We talked about Claude Code, Claude Tag, Fable, coding agent security, evals, tool design, and how Anthropic use these tools themselves. The full video of the session is now available on YouTube. Below is an edited copy of the transcript, with extra links and my own bolded highlights. A few top-level notes if you don't want to watch the video or…

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Reverse-engineering is cheap now

Reverse-engineering is cheap now

I keep hearing anecdotes from people who used coding agents to reverse-engineer and automate devices in their homes. I think this is an interesting illustration of the impact of the reduced cost of writing code. Prior to agents, it was entirely possible to reverse-engineer home devices. The problem was the ROI - was it really worth all of that effort? More importantly, any experienced programmer knows that undocumented, unstable APIs like that may well change or break in the future. Is that…

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Who’s Afraid of Chinese Models?

Who’s Afraid of Chinese Models?

Who’s Afraid of Chinese Models? Interesting proposal from Ben Thompson that both addresses the hypocrisy of labs outlawing distillation against their models despite training on unlicensed data, and could help US open models compete more effectively with their Chinese counterparts: The U.S. should pass a law that (1) makes explicit that collecting data for training models is fair use, and (2) bars terms of service that forbid distillation, for U.S. companies at a minimum. Stopping distillation —…

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Quoting Sam Altman

Quoting Sam Altman

We have been having extensive discussions around open source strategy. We will discuss it more at our next board meeting, but one thing we’d like to do soon is to create a language model with the approximate capability of GPT-3 that can run locally on consumer hardware and release that. We’d like to do it soon, before Stability or someone else does. In general, we think this helps discourage others from releasing similarly-powerful models, and makes it harder for new efforts to get funded.…

Simon Willison's Weblog
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